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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALON TROPIC AN A MIDVALE, Inc. : 
a Utah Corp. : REPLY BRIEF OF 
: APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : Case No. 20090057-CA 
MIDVALE CITY Corp., : 
a Municipal corp. : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court has jurisdiction to entertain purely legal and constitutional 
arguments brought before the first time before the District Court. Plaintiff contends 
that the procedures used by the Midvale City Planning Commission and the Midvale 
City Council did not grant Plaintiff due process of law, in that there was no 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or to challenge hearsay. The City Planning 
Commission is not competent to decide whether its own procedures are adequate, and 
whether they grant Plaintiff due process. 
1 
The decision of the Planning Commission, as affirmed by the City Council, was 
not supported by "substantial evidence". Thus, the decision was "arbitrary and 
capricious". The Planning Commission relied on vague and unsubstantiated 
allegations of this conduct. The allegations made against Plaintiff did not show a 
sufficient violation on a part of Plaintiff of the terms of the Conditional Use Permit. 
The Conditional Use Permit only required Plaintiff to maintain adequate security in 
its parking lot, and on its premises; and Plaintiff has done that. Thus, there is 
inadequate support for a revocation of the Conditional User Permit. Plaintiff was 
given no authority, and not required by the terms of the Conditional User Permit, to 
become a law enforcement agency in the neighborhood surrounding its establishment. 
Defendant has complained that Plaintiff has insufficiently marshaled the 
evidence for supporting the decisions of the Planning Commission; but Defendant has 
not stated in what way the "marshaling is inadequate." Plaintiff has indeed set forth 
all of the allegations and "evidence" relied upon by the Planning Commission in its 
revocation; and has shown that it is inadequate as a matter of law. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONSTRAINED TO ARGUE LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES BEFORE THE MID VALE CITY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, A BODY WHICH HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS THOSE 
ISSUES 
Defendant starts out its Brief with a claim that Plaintiff did not properly 
preserve its argument concerning the lack of due process before the City Planning 
Commission, because Plaintiff did not challenge the Rules of the Planning 
Commission, while in front of that body. The City makes this argument before this 
Court, despite the fact that it did not preserve its own argument on this point by 
raising it before the District Court. A review of the City's Memorandum on Summary 
Judgment does not show that the Defendant raised a procedural objection to 
Plaintiffs arguments before the District Court; and therefore those arguments here 
are precluded by the very principles it cites in an attempt to preclude Plaintiffs 
arguments before this Court. 
Further, in only one and a half pages of argument before this Court, Defendant 
cites only a footnote in an unpublished opinion of this Court. That decision 
purportedly declines to consider issues not brought up before an administrative body 
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(in this case the Department of Workforce Services) and argued for the first time 
before the District Court. That decision is irrelevant to the instant case. A public 
hearing held before the Midvale Planning Commission had none of the attributes of 
the administrative law hearing referred to in the cited case. The City Planning 
Commission is not competent to hear legal issues; and those issues are not within its 
purview. Furthermore, Plaintiff was given no opportunity to prepare any formal 
presentation before the City Planning Commission, and was not even given a set of 
ground rules. The Planning Commission Meeting turned out basically to be a "gripe 
session" in which neighbors of Plaintiffs business, without the opportunity to be 
cross-examined, or without being held to any rules of proof, simply unloaded their 
complaints. Some of those complaints, as previously pointed out by Plaintiff, were 
highly unlikely to be related to Plaintiffs business. 
The City errs, however, in comparing the powers and duties of the hearing 
officer to those of statutory State agencies which have been granted specific judicial 
powers. Clearly the Planning Commission (as is the City Council) is a political 
body, not a judicial one. This makes its function very different from that of the State 
agency, and its administrative appeals officials, which exercise a quasi-judicial role. 
Further, the power of "agencies" and other administrative officers does not 
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extend to pure questions of law, and certainly not to constitutional issues. See 
Brumley v. Tax Commission. 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993) where the Supreme 
Court held: "In contrast, where purely legal questions are raised that cannot be 
determined in an administrative proceeding, the pursuit of the administrative 
proceeding may serve no purpose." In that case, the Court allowed an aggrieved 
party to bypass the administrative proceeding in its entirety when the legal questions 
presented were outside its power to determine. See also the similar decision in the 
more recent case of TDM. Inc. v. Tax Commission, 2004 UT App 433, 103 P.3d 190 
(Utah App. 2004); Cert. Denied 109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005). The constitutional issues 
were properly presented before the trial Court; and are properly preserved for review 
here. See also § 78A-7-118(7) granting jurisdiction to this Court to review 
constitutional rulings of the District Court in cases which originally arose in the 
Justice Court. This jurisdiction was amended in 2001 to require only that the 
constitutional question is litigated in the District Court, rather than the previous 
requirement that such an issue must have been brought before the Justice Court in the 
first instance. See South Salt Lake v. Terkelson 2002 UT App 405, 61 P.3d 282 
(Utah App. 2002) at f^ 6 for a discussion of the change. While it is true that the 
District Court here did not conduct a "trial de novo" as it does in the appeal of a 
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Justice Court case, it need not do so to reach the purely legal issues. While a jury 
may determine facts, from a carefully organized proceeding, the jury is not charged 
with determining questions of law. If an administrative law judge may not decide 
purely legal issues, the Planning Commission is certainly not competent top make 
such rulings. In this case, the City contends that the Planning Commission should 
have been allowed to decide whether it was properly constituted for the purpose it 
was serving, and to decide the extent of its own authority. That is nonsensical. 
The issues were fairly before the District Court, and were therefore properly 
preserved for appeal. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT VIOLATE TFIE TERMS OF THE CONDITIONAL USE 
PERMIT REGARDING SECURITY. 
In Point II B of its Brief, the City cites, and distinguishes, a recent case from 
this Court, 14th St. Gym. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 183 P.3d 262,2008 UT App 127 
(Utah App. 2008). The City acknowledges that this Court refused to hold the 14th 
Street Gym responsible for activities of third parties over which it had no control, and 
of which it had not been given direct knowledge. The City notes, however, this 
Court's statement that its decision "does not speak to whether a provisional license 
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may be conditioned on the conduct of persons outside a licensees's knowledge or 
control. Id, at Tf 13. That statement has little to do with the instant case. As the City 
acknowledges, "the conditions of the CUP imposed a duty on Appellant not to allow 
drinking, loitering, or any illegal activity within the parking lot, or neighboring 
property." Plaintiff has properly discharged its duty to police it parking lot. While 
that seems to give responsibility to Plaintiff to become a second police force for the 
entire neighborhood, that guideline was modified by the requirement that "the 
applicant shall prepare a final copy of the In-House Security Plan and Security 
Personnel Responsibilities document and submit this final copy of Midvale City." 
The final In-House Security Plan, specifically approved by the City, included the 
following: 
4.- Two roaming Securities will walk the Parking Lot to Aid Patrons to locate 
a Parking Slot, prevent Drinking, Fighting, Loitering and Littering in the 
Parking Lot. Signs will be posted with the following messages, in English and 
in Spanish: DRINKING AND DRIVING DON'T MIX; THIS MARKING 
LOT IS PRIVATE PROPERTY NO DRINKING AND/OR LOITERING 
ALLOWED; VEHICLES PARKED ON RESIDENTIAL AREA WILL BE 
TOWED AT THE OWNER'S EXPENSE. Chains will be used to close the 
West Exits from 9pm ti 2:45am or until the Parking Lot is cleared,. Chains are 
to be easily removed in the case of Emergency. (City App. Rec. 45) 
That Security Plan does not require Plaintiff or its employees to patrol the 
entire neighborhood, contrary to the assertions of Defendant. Nor, of course, does it 
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deputize Plaintiffs security personnel to enforce laws on public streets or on private 
property. Furthermore, the evidence before this Court is that neither Plaintiff nor its 
employees have ever been cited for a violation of the law. And the City has made no 
attempt to show that they have unsuccessfully sought additional actions by Plaintiff 
or its security personnel. For instance, the City alleges arrests in the parking lot for 
minor offenses, including possession of alcohol and public urination. None of those 
offenses were reported to Plaintiff. Just as in 14th Street Gym, Plaintiff cannot be 
charged with knowledge or responsibility regarding these activities. Most of the 
activities complained about, of course, were in neighboring residential areas; and at 
least some of them have very tenuous ties to Plaintiff. Note again allegations that at 
least some activities were more likely associated with heavy bridge and highway 
construction in the immediate area, most specifically directly in front of Caesar's 
Motorcycle Shop. Even without the photos which the Court has declined to accept as 
evidence, the testimony of the motorcycle chop owner is sufficient to show that all 
neighborhood problems are not related to Plaintiffs business. Because "evidence" 
on this point included much vague and irrelevant material, it is insufficient to support 
to revocation. 
Appellant has always sought to be a good corporate citizen of the City and 
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neighborhood. The agreement made in 2005 to increase security and alertness has 
been followed to the very best of Plaintiff s ability. Perhaps it is true that Appellant 
could have or should have objected to terms of the conditional use permit which were 
clearly impossible to comply with. It is certainly just as valid, however, for Plaintiff 
to have assumed that the conditions would not be applied in an unreasonable manner. 
Plaintiff here is not "asking the Court to hold the conditions invalid." (Aple. Br. 20) 
It is merely asking the Court to prohibit enforcement in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner, including the impossible requirement that Plaintiff somehow should have 
become that neighborhood policeman. 
The City cites a recent unpublished decision from this Court, Taft v. Draper 
City. 2006 UT App 315 (Utah App. 2006) which holds that the rules of evidence do 
not need to be strictly complied with in an administrative hearings, and that "while 
hearsay evidence is admissible in proceedings before administrative agencies, 
findings of fact cannot be based exclusively on hearsay testimony." Plaintiff contends 
that far too large a proportion of the "testimony" given against Plaintiff in the 
unregulated proceeding before the City Planning Commission, was hearsay, or other 
unreliable material. It is insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain the revocation. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE. 
The City, with only three short paragraphs or argument, (Aple. Br. 5-6) 
contends that Plaintiff has not "marshaled the evidence" in favor of the decision 
below; and that therefore the Midvale City decision should not be disturbed. The 
standard of review of a licensing or land use decision before this Court is that the 
decision must not be "arbitrary and capricious", and they must be supported by 
"substantial evidence. In order to contest the City's decision, Plaintiff must, of 
course, show where the evidence is not substantial enough to uphold the decision. 
Plaintiff has done that, and in fact went through the entire transcript of the Planning 
Commission's hearing, listing each "witness" and what was said. Once again the City 
does not like the way that Plaintiff cited to the transcript; but the citations were proper 
(and this Court has now so ruled). The City does not state, in its three paragraphs, in 
what way Plaintiff failed to "marshal the evidence"; but there was no attempt to 
avoid any of the statements made at the hearing. The statement of facts was as 
complete as reasonably could be expected; and the problems with the City's case, 
based on those facts, were pointed out. There was much sound and fury, and 
relatively little substance, to the allegations concerning the alleged failures of 
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Plaintiff to do its contractual duty. The complaints come down to the number of 
people in the area on weekend evenings. Plaintiff agreed to do certain things to 
manage the crowds; and Plaintiff maintains that it did so. The facts are before the 
Court; and they are sufficiently so for a decision to be made as to whether the 
Plaintiff Commission decision was supported by substantial evidence". The is the 
duty of the Plaintiff; and Defendant has in no way shown how that duty has not been 
met. 
CONCLUSION 
The procedures uses, and the evidence relied upon, by the City in revoking the 
Conditional Use Permit, do not support the remedy chosen by the City; and the 
revocation should be reversed. 
DATED this I "day of July, 2009. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
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